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The fast-growing market of autonomous vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and fleets in general necessitates
the design of smart and automatic navigation systems considering the stochastic latency along different paths
in the traffic network. The longstanding shortest path problem in a deterministic network, whose counterpart
in a congestion game setting is Wardrop equilibrium, has been studied extensively, but it is well known that
finding the notion of an optimal path is challenging in a traffic network with stochastic arc delays. In this
work, we propose three classes of risk-averse equilibria for an atomic stochastic congestion game in its general
form where the arc delay distributions are load dependent and not necessarily independent of each other. The
three classes are risk-averse equilibrium (RAE), mean-variance equilibrium (MVE), and conditional value
at risk level α equilibrium (CVaRαE) whose notions of risk-averse best responses are based on maximizing
the probability of taking the shortest path, minimizing a linear combination of mean and variance of path
delay, and minimizing the expected delay at a specified risky quantile of the delay distributions, respectively.
We prove that for any finite stochastic atomic congestion game, the risk-averse, mean-variance, and CVaRα
equilibria exist. We show that for risk-averse travelers, the Braess paradox may not occur to the extent
presented originally since players do not necessarily travel along the shortest path in expectation, but they
take the uncertainty of travel time into consideration as well. We show through some examples that the price
of anarchy can be improved when players are risk-averse and travel according to one of the three classes of
risk-averse equilibria rather than the Wardrop equilibrium.
Key words : Stochastic Congestion Games, Autonomous Vehicles, Risk-Aversion, Risk-Averse Equilibrium.
1. Introduction
The intelligent transportation systems are growing faster than ever with the speedy emergence of
autonomous vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, Amazon delivery robots, Uber/Lyft self-driving
cars, and such. One of the principal components of such systems is the navigation system whose
goal is to provide travelers with fast and reliable paths from their sources to destinations. In a
fleet of vehicles, an equilibrium is achieved when no travelers have any incentives in a certain
sense to change routes unilaterally. In the classical Wardrop equilibrium (Wardrop and Whitehead
1952, Wardrop 1952), travelers have incentives to change routes if they have an alternative route
that has lower expected travel time. In other words, the optimality metric is based on minimizing
1
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the expected travel time in the Wardrop equilibrium. In the context of transportation though,
collisions, weather conditions, road works, traffic signals, and varying traffic conditions can cause
deviations in travel times (Ordo´n˜ez and Stier-Moses 2010). As a result, the path with the minimum
expected travel time may not be reliable due to its high variability. Similarly, in the context of
telecommunication networks, noise, signal degradation, interference, re-transmission, and malfunc-
tioning equipment can cause variability in transmission time from source to destination (Ordo´n˜ez
and Stier-Moses 2010). The empirical works by Abdel-Aty, Kitamura, and Jovanis (1995), Kazimi,
Brownstone, and Gosh (2000), Lam and Small (2001), and Small (1999) also support the fact that
taking travel time uncertainty into account is indeed an essential criterion in navigation systems.
As mentioned above, minimizing the expected travel time is inadequate in scenarios involving risk
due to variability of travel times. In order to address this issue, we study a richer class of congestion
games called stochastic congestion games in an atomic setting, where the travel times along different
arcs of the network are random variables that are not necessarily independent of each other. In
this framework, we introduce probability statements regarding the risk-averse best response of a
traveler given the choice of the rest of travelers in the network. We propose three classes of risk-
averse equilibria for stochastic congestion games: risk-averse equilibrium (RAE), mean-variance
equilibrium (MVE), and conditional value at risk level α equilibrium (CVaRαE), whose notions of
risk-averse best responses are based on maximizing the probability of traveling along the shortest
path (also known as Risk-Averse Best Action Decision with Incomplete Information (R-ABADI)),
minimizing a linear combination of mean and variance of path delay, and minimizing the expected
delay at a specified risky quantile of the delay distributions, respectively. We prove that the risk-
averse, mean-variance, and CVaRα equilibria exist for any finite stochastic atomic congestion game.
Note that two equilibria similar to the mean-variance and CVaR equilibria exist in the literature
and are discussed in the related work section, but the probability distributions of travel times are
load independent or link delays are considered to be independent in the literature, which is not
the case in this article. It is noteworthy that most studies on stochastic congestion games make
use of simplifying assumptions such as considering the arc delay distributions to be independent
of their loads or adding independent and identically distributed errors to nominal delays of arcs
neglecting their differences. In the Braess paradox (Braess 1968, Murchland 1970), which is known
to be a counterintuitive example rather than a paradox, the risk-neutral/selfish travelers select the
shortest path in expected travel time, which maximizes the social delay/cost incurred by the whole
society. Although the focus of this article is not on deriving bounds on price of anarchy, we study
the Braess paradox in a stochastic setting under the three proposed risk-averse equilibria and show
that the risk-averse behavior of travelers results in improving the social delay/cost incurred by the
society; and as a result, the price of anarchy is improved if travelers are risk-averse. As the result,
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the Braess paradox may not occur to the extent presented originally if travelers are risk-averse.
Furthermore, we study the Pigou network (Pigou 1920) in a stochastic setting and observe that the
price of anarchy is also improved if travelers are risk-averse in the senses discussed above. Note that
the Pigou networks are prevalent in traffic/telecommunication networks. Hence, providing travelers
with risk-averse navigation can decrease the social delay/cost in the real world applications.
The article is structured in the following way. The related work is discussed in Section 2. The
stochastic congestion game is formally defined in Section 3. The three proposed classes of equi-
libria, i.e. risk-averse, mean-variance, and CVaRα equilibria, are presented in Section 4 and their
existences in any finite stochastic congestion game are proven; detailed proofs can be found in the
Appendix. Numerical results including the study of the Pigou and Braess networks as well as notes
for practitioners are provided in Section 5. Finally, conclusions and discussion of opportunities for
future work are provided in Section 6.
2. Related Work
In this section, the literature on navigation for both deterministic and stochastic networks is
presented first, then the literature on deterministic and stochastic congestion games is discussed in
details. The main focus of the literature review is to motivate the necessity of risk-averse algorithms
for navigation and congestion games in a stochastic setting.
The problem of finding the shortest path in a transportation/telecommunication traffic network
is one of the main parts of the in-vehicle navigation systems. This problem has been studied well
in deterministic networks resulting in many efficient algorithms, e.g., the algorithms developed by
Dijkstra (1959), and Dreyfus (1969); also see (Schrijver 2012, Fu, Sun, and Rilett 2006, Dial 1969,
Tarjan 1983, Lawler 1976, Pierce 1975, Orda and Rom 1990, Kaufman and Smith 1993, Hall 1993,
Chabini 1997), and (Hosseini et al. 2017). Although finding the shortest path problem is well under-
stood in deterministic networks, the definition of an optimal path and how to identify such a path
is more challenging in the stochastic version of the problem. There have been multiple approaches
to define the optimal path in stochastic networks as summarized below. The least expected travel
time is studied by Loui (1983) and is equivalent to the deterministic case from a computational
point of view. The path with the least expected time may be sub-optimal for risk-averse travelers
due to its high variability and uncertainty; as the result, the probability distributions of link travel
times need to be considered explicitly to find the most reliable path. In this manner, Frank (1969)
proposed the optimal path to be the one that maximizes the probability of realizing a travel time
that less than a threshold, Sigal, Pritsker, and Solberg (1980) proposed the optimal path to be
the one that maximizes the probability of realizing the shortest time, and Chen and Ji (2005)
proposed the optimal path to be the one with minimum travel time budget required to meet a
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travel time reliability constraint. For more variants of the mentioned algorithms, refer to (Nie and
Fan 2006, Nie and Wu 2009, Zeng et al. 2015, Xing and Zhou 2011, Howard 2012, Hall 1986, Fu
and Rilett 1998, Waller and Ziliaskopoulos 2002, Miller-Hooks and Mahmassani 2000, Mirchandani
et al. 1986, Mirchandani 1976, Murthy and Sarkar 1996, Fan 2003, Xiao and Lo 2013, Bell 2009,
Chen, Bell, and Bogenberger 2010), and (Lo, Luo, and Siu 2006).
In the context of route selection in a fleet of vehicles, a game emerges between all travelers
where the action of each traveler affects the travel time of the other travelers, which creates a
competitive situation forcing travelers to strategize their decisions. In a deterministic network, the
mentioned game is formalized by Wardrop and Whitehead (1952), Neumann (1928), Von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1947), and Nash et al. (1950). However, it is not realistic to consider the link
delays to be known prior to making a decision due to external factors that make the travel times
uncertain. In order to put this in perspective, several approaches have been adopted by researchers
to capture the stochastic behavior of the traffic networks. For example, Harsanyi (1967, 1968)
proposed Bayesian games that consider the incomplete information of payoffs, Ordo´n˜ez and Stier-
Moses (2010) modeled the risk-averse behavior of travelers by padding the expected travel time
along paths with a safety margin, Watling (2006) proposed an equilibrium based on the optimality
measure of minimizing the probability of being late or maximizing the probability of being on
time, Szeto, O’Brien, and O’Mahony (2006) associated a cost with the travel time uncertainty
based on travelers’ risk-averse behavior, Chen and Zhou (2010) proposed an equilibrium based
on the optimality measure of minimizing the conditional expectation of travel time beyond a
travel time budget, and Bell and Cassir (2002) proposed to play out all possible scenarios before
making a choice. For more details in the context of traffic networks, we refer readers to (Aashtiani
and Magnanti 1981, Aghassi and Bertsimas 2006, Altman et al. 2006, Hayashi, Yamashita, and
Fukushima 2005, Mirchandani and Soroush 1987, Nie 2011, Connors and Sumalee 2009, Schmo¨cker
et al. 2009, Fonzone et al. 2012, Angelidakis, Fotakis, and Lianeas 2013, Nikolova and Stier-Moses
2011, 2015), and (Correa, Hoeksma, and Schro¨der 2019).
3. Problem Statement
Consider a directed graph (network) G = (N ,E) with a node set N = [N ] := {1,2, . . . ,N} and
directed link (edge) set E with cardinality |E|, where the pair (i, j) ∈ E indicates a directed link
from node i ∈N to node j ∈N in the directed graph. Denote the set of source-destination (SD)
pairs with K⊆N ×N , where for the SD pair k = (sk, dk) ∈K, sk 6= dk, the set of simple directed
paths from sk to dk in G is denoted by Pk, and let nk be the number of players (travelers, vehicles,
or data packages) associated with source-destination k. Let P := ∪k∈KPk be the set of all paths.
A feasible assignment m := {mp : p∈P} allocates a non-negative number of players to every path
Yekkehkhany and Nagi: Risk-Averse Equilibrium for Autonomous Vehicles in Stochastic Congestion Games
5
p ∈ P such that ∑p∈Pkmp = nk for all k ∈ K. As a result, the number of players along link e ∈ E
denoted by me is given by me =
∑
{p∈P:e∈p}m
p.
The latency (delay or travel time) along link e is load-dependent which is denoted by the non-
negative continuous random variable Le(me) with marginal probability density function (pdf)
fe(x|me) and mean le(me). Note that the number of players along an edge is determined by an
assignment m, so Le(m), fe(x|m), and le(m) can be used instead of Le(me), fe(x|me), and le(me),
respectively. Furthermore, the latency along links of the graph can be dependent, in which case,
the joint pdf of latency over all links is denoted by fe1,e2,...,e|E|(x1, x2, . . . , x|E||m1,m2, . . . ,m|E|),
which can be denoted as fE(x1, x2, . . . , x|E||m). Given the link latency defined above, the nominal
latency of player i along path pi ∈P under a given assignment m is simply Li(m) :=
∑
e∈pi Le(m)
with pdf f i(x|m) = ∂
(∫ ∫ · · ·∫{∑e∈pi xe≤x} fE(x1, x2, . . . , x|E||m) dx1dx2 . . . dx|E|)/∂x and mean
li(m) =
∑
e∈pi le(m).
The stochastic congestion game consists of n :=
∑
k∈K nk players (travelers), where player i ∈
[n] := {1,2, . . . , n} is associated with the corresponding source-destination pair k(i)∈K. As a result,
Pk(i) is the set of possible pure strategies (actions or paths) for player i. The pure strategy profile
of all n players is denoted by p := (p1, p2, . . . , pn), where pi ∈Pk(i), that fully specifies all actions in
the game. The set of all pure strategy profiles is the Cartesian product of pure strategy sets of all
players which is denoted by P :=Pk(1)×Pk(2) · · ·×Pk(n). Let p−i := (p1, p2, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pn) be
the pure strategies of all players except player i, so p= (pi,p−i). Given the pure strategy profile
p, the number of players on a path p ∈ P is given by mp =∑ni=1 1{pi = p}, and the number of
players on a link e ∈ E is given by me =
∑
{p∈P:e∈p}
∑n
i=1 1{pi = p}. Let m(p) show the number
of players on all paths which is fully determined by the pure strategy p. As a result, given the
pure strategy profile p= (pi,p−i), the latency of player i by choosing the path pi is the random
variable Li(m(p)) =
∑
e∈pi Le(m(p)) with pdf f
i(x|m(p)) and mean li(m(p)) =∑e∈pi le(m(p)).
For simplicity, instead of using Li(m(p)), f i(x|m(p)), and li(m(p)), we use Li(p), f i(x|p), and
li(p), respectively.
The mixed strategy of player i is denoted by σi ∈ Σi, where Σi is the set of all probability
distributions over the set of pure strategies Pk(i), and σi(p) is the probability that player i selects
path p. The mixed strategy profile of all n players is denoted by σ := (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn), where σi ∈Σi.
The set of all mixed strategy profiles is the Cartesian product of mixed strategy sets of all players
which is denoted by Σ := Σ1 ×Σ2 · · · ×Σn. Let σ−i := (σ1, σ2, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σn) be the mixed
strategies of all players except player i, so σ = (σi,σ−i). The latency of player i by selecting path
pi when the other [n] \ i players select paths according to a mixed strategy σ−i is denoted by the
random variable L
i
(pi,σ−i) that has the following pdf using the law of total probability:
f¯ i(x|(pi,σ−i)) =
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
f i(x|(pi,p−i)) ·σ(p−i)
)
, (1)
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where σ(p−i) =
∏
j∈[n]\i σj(pj) and pj is the corresponding strategy of player j in p−i, and the
mean of the random variable is given as
l
i
(pi,σ−i) :=E[L
i
(pi,σ−i)] =
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
li(pi,p−i) ·σ(p−i)
)
. (2)
The expected average delay (latency) incurred by the n players in the stochastic congestion
game under the pure strategy profile p, also known as the social cost or social delay in this
context, is denoted by D(p) := 1
n
∑n
i=1 l
i(p). The social delay under the mixed strategy σ is D(σ) :=
1
n
∑
p∈P
∑n
i=1σ(p) · li(p), where σ(p) =
∏
i∈[n] σi(pi) and pi is the corresponding strategy of player
i in p. The (pure) optimal load assignment denoted by o minimizes social delay among all possible
(pure) load assignments which might be in contrast with the selfish behavior of players. The (pure)
price of anarchy (PoA) of a congestion game is the maximum ratio D(p)/D(o) over all equilibria
p of the game. Throughout the article, we follow the convention that y ≤ x means that y is less
than or equal to all elements of the vector x.
4. Risk-Averse Equilibrium for Stochastic Congestion Games
In the following sub-section, illustrative examples are provided with analysis of their equilibria in
classic and risk-averse frameworks which motivate the novel risk-averse approach for stochastic
congestion games presented in this article.
4.1. Illustrative Examples
The Pigou network (Pigou 2013) is one of the simplest networks studied in congestion games. We
first use the Pigou network to clearly state the motivation of the current work in the first example.
We then study the more controversial network used by Braess (1968) in the famous Braess’s paradox
in the second example. The two examples below set grounding for the risk-averse equilibrium for
congestion games proposed in this article.
Example 1. Consider the Pigou network with two parallel links between source and destination
as shown in Figure 1. There are n players (vehicles or data packages) to travel from source to
destination. The top and bottom links are labeled as 1 and 2 with loads m1 and m2 = n−m1,
respectively. The travel times on links 1 and 2 are respectively independent random variables
L1(m1) and L2(m2) with expected values l1(m1) =
m1
n
and l2(m2) = 1 and pdfs
f1(x|m1) = α
(
2exp
(
− 100
(
x− m1
4n
)2)
·1
{
0≤ x≤ m1
2n
}
+ 3exp
(
− 100
(
x− 3m1
2n
)2)
·1
{
5m1
4n
≤ x≤ 7m1
4n
})
,
f2(x|m2) = βexp
(
−100 (x− 1)2
)
·1
{
3
4
≤ x≤ 5
4
}
,
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S D
𝑙1 𝑚1 =
𝑚1
𝑛
𝑙2 𝑚2 = 1
𝑛
𝑚1
4𝑛
3𝑚1
2𝑛
𝑓1(𝑥|𝑚1)
1
𝑓2(𝑥|𝑚2)
Figure 1 The Pigou network in Example 1 with the load-dependent latency pdfs and the corresponding means
of links.
where α and β are constants for which each of the two distributions integrate to one and 1{.} is
the indicator function.
The well-known Wardrop equilibrium (Wardrop 1952, Wardrop and Whitehead 1952), also Nash
equilibrium (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947), for the Pigou network in Example 1 is that all
the n players travel along the top link since it is the weakly dominant strategy for any player as the
expected latency incurred along the top link is always less than or equal to the expected latency
incurred along the bottom link, l1(m1) =
m1
n
≤ 1 = l2(m2). As a result, the Wardrop equilibrium for
Pigou network is p∗W = (1,1, . . . ,1) with social delay DW (p
∗
W ) = 1. However, although the expected
latency along the top link is less than or equal to that of the bottom link, l1(m1) ≤ l2(m2), the
variance of travel time along the top link at full capacity is larger than that along the bottom link,
which increases the risk and uncertainty of traveling along the top link (Yekkehkhany, Murray, and
Nagi 2020, Yekkehkhany et al. 2020, Yekkehkhany et al. 2019). In fact, the bottom link with higher
expected travel time is more likely to have a lower delay than the top link at full capacity, i.e.,
P
(
L2(0)≤L1(n)
)
= 0.6> 0.5. As a result, a risk-averse player selects the bottom link for commute
when the top link is at full capacity, especially if it is a one-time trip. We will also shown later,
the risk-averse behavior of players decreases social delay for this example. As an example, consider
a traveler who wants to go from hotel to airport who has two options for this trip: taking the
highway that has lower expected travel time, but is more likely to get congested due to traffic jams
and crashes (top link in Pigou network), or taking the urban streets with a higher expected travel
time and lower congestion (the bottom link in Pigou network). A risk-neutral player travels along
the top link with lower expected latency, but a risk-averse player travels along the bottom link to
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S D
𝑙1 𝑚1 =
𝑚1
𝑛
𝑙3 𝑚3 = 1
𝑛
𝑚1
2𝑛
3𝑚1
2𝑛
1
𝑙4 𝑚4 =
𝑚4
𝑛
𝑙2 𝑚2 = 1
𝑃 𝐿5 𝑚5 = 0 = 1
A
B
𝑓3(𝑥|𝑚3)
1
𝑓2(𝑥|𝑚2)
𝑚4
2𝑛
3𝑚4
2𝑛
𝑓1(𝑥|𝑚1)
𝑓4(𝑥|𝑚4)
Figure 2 The Braess network in Example 2 with the load-dependent latency pdfs and the corresponding means
of links.
assure not to incur a long delay and miss the flight. Even in everyday commutes between home and
work, the expected delay over many days may not be a desirable objective to minimize. No-one
desires to arrive early to work some days but late on others, and to be penalized accordingly.
The Braess network, studied in the next example, further enforces the fact that minimizing the
expected delay is not desirable for risk-averse players.
Example 2. Consider the Braess network depicted in Figure 2. There are n players (vehicles
or data packages) to travel from source to destination. Other than the source and destination,
there are two nodes A and B in the network. The directed links (S,A), (A,D), (S,B), (B,D), and
(A,B) are referred to as links 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 with loads m1, m2, m3, m4, and m5, respectively.
The travel times on links 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are respectively independent random variables L1(m1),
L2(m2), L3(m3), L4(m4), and L5(m5) with expected values l1(m1) =
m1
n
, l2(m2) = 1, l3(m3) = 1,
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l4(m4) =
m4
n
, and l5(m5) = 0 and pdfs
f1(x|m1) = γ
(
exp
(
− 100
(
x− m1
2n
)2)
·1
{
0≤ x≤ m1
n
}
+ exp
(
− 100
(
x− 3m1
2n
)2)
·1
{
m1
n
< x≤ 2m1
n
})
,
f2(x|m2) = ζexp
(
−100 (x− 1)2
)
·1
{
1
2
≤ x≤ 3
2
}
,
f3(x|m3) = ζexp
(
−100 (x− 1)2
)
·1
{
1
2
≤ x≤ 3
2
}
,
f4(x|m4) = γ
(
exp
(
− 100
(
x− m4
2n
)2)
·1
{
0≤ x≤ m4
n
}
+ exp
(
− 100
(
x− 3m4
2n
)2)
·1
{
m4
n
< x≤ 2m4
n
})
,
where γ and ζ are constants for which the distributions integrate to one, 1{.} is the indicator
function, and P
(
L5(m5) = 0
)
= 1. There are three paths from source to destination, (S,A,D),
(S,A,B,D), and (S,B,D), that are referred to as paths 1,2, and 3 with loads m1,m2, and m3,
respectively, where the difference between links and paths should be clear from the context. Note
that the link loads are related to path loads as m1 =m
1 +m2, m2 =m
1, m3 =m
3, m4 =m
2 +m3,
and m5 =m
2, and the delays along paths are related to link delays as L1(m) =L1(m1) +L2(m2),
L2(m) =L1(m1) +L5(m5) +L4(m4) =L1(m1) +L4(m4), and L
3(m) =L3(m3) +L4(m4).
The Wardrop (Nash) equilibrium for the Braess network in Example 2 is that all the n players
travel along path 2 since it is the weakly dominant path for any player as the expected latency
incurred along path 2 is always less than or equal to the expected latency incurred along the other
two paths 1 and 3,
l2(m) = l1(m1) + l5(m5) + l4(m4) =
m1
n
+
m4
n
{
≤ m1
n
+ 1 = l1(m1) + l2(m2) = l
1(m),
≤ 1 + m4
n
= l3(m3) + l4(m4) = l
3(m).
As a result, the Wardrop equilibrium for Braess network is p∗W = (2,2, . . . ,2) with social delay
DW (p
∗
W ) = 2. However, although path 2 has latency less than or equal to that of paths 1 and 3,
l2(m)≤ (l1(m), l3(m)), the variance of travel time along path 2 at full capacity is larger than that
along paths 1 and 3, which increases the risk and uncertainty of traveling along path 2. In fact,
path 1 (or 3) with higher expected travel time is more likely to have a lower delay than the rest
of the paths, i.e., P
(
L1(0)≤ (L2(n),L3(0)))= 3
8
> 1
4
= P
(
L2(n)≤ (L1(0),L3(0))). As a result, a
risk-averse player selects paths 1 or 3 for commute when path 2 is at full capacity, and as is shown
later, the risk-averse behavior of players decreases social delay for this example.
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4.2. Risk-Averse Equilibrium
In the classical Wardrop (Nash) equilibrium, the best response of player i ∈ [n] to the mixed
strategy σ−i of the other [n] \ i players is defined as the set
arg min
pi∈Pi
l
i
(pi,σ−i).
In other words, the best response for player i given σ−i is defined as the path that minimizes the
expected travel time. However, motivated by Examples 1 and 2, the path with minimum expected
latency may have a high volatility as well that causes risky scenarios for travelers. As a result,
the classical Wardrop (Nash) equilibrium that ignores the distribution of path latency except for
taking the expected latency into account, that does not carry any information about variance and
the shape of the distribution, falls short in addressing risk-averse behavior of players. In this article,
motivated by Examples 1 and 2, we propose a Risk-Averse Best Action Decision with Incomplete
Information (R-ABADI) of a player to the strategy of the other players in a stochastic congestion
game as follows.
Definition 1. Given the mixed strategy profile σ−i of players [n] \ i, the set of mixed strategy
risk-averse best responses of player i is the set of all probability distributions over the set
arg max
pi∈Pi
P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)≤Li(Pi \ pi,σ−i)
)
, (3)
where what we mean by L
i
(pi,σ−i) being less than or equal to L
i
(Pi \ pi,σ−i) when Pi \ pi 6= ∅
is that L
i
(pi,σ−i) is less than or equal to L
i
(p′i,σ−i) for all p
′
i ∈ Pi \ pi; otherwise, if Pi \ pi = ∅,
player i only has a single option that can be played. The same randomness on the action of players
[n]\ i is considered in Li(pi,σ−i) for all pi ∈Pi. Given the mixed strategy σ−i of players [n]\ i, the
risk-averse best response set of player i’s strategies is denoted by RB(σ−i), which is in general a
set-valued function.
The risk-averse equilibrium for stochastic congestion games is defined as follows.
Definition 2. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2 , . . . , σ
∗
N) is a risk-averse equilibrium if and only
if σ∗i ∈RB(σ∗−i) for all i∈ [n].
The following theorem proves the existence of a risk-averse equilibrium for any stochastic con-
gestion game with finite number of players and pure strategy sets Pi for all i ∈ [n] with finite
cardinality.
Theorem 1. For any finite n-player stochastic congestion game, a risk-averse equilibrium exists.
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix A.
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As a direct result of Definitions 1 and 2, the pure strategy risk-averse best response and pure
strategy risk-averse equilibrium are defined as follows. The pure strategy risk-averse best response
of player i to the pure strategy p−i of players [n] \ i is the set{
arg maxpi∈Pi P
(
Li
(
pi,p−i
)≤Li (Pi \ pi,p−i)), if Pi \ pi 6= ∅,
pi, if Pi \ pi = ∅.
(4)
Given the pure strategy p−i of players [n]\i, the risk-averse best response set of player i in Equation
(4) is denoted by RB(p−i) (overloading notation, RB(.) is used for both pure and mixed strategy
risk-averse best responses). As a result, a pure strategy profile p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2, . . . , p
∗
n) is a pure strategy
risk-averse equilibrium if and only if p∗i ∈RB(p∗−i) for all i∈ [n].
Strict dominance in the classical Wardrop (Nash) equilibrium is defined as follows. A pure
strategy pi ∈Pi of player i strictly dominates a second pure strategy p′i ∈Pi of the player if
li(pi,p−i)< l
i(p′i,p−i), ∀p−i ∈P−i.
The solution concept of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies can also be applied to
the risk-averse equilibrium using the following definition.
Definition 3. A pure strategy pi ∈ Pi of player i strictly dominates a second pure strategy
p′i ∈Pi of the player in the risk-averse equilibrium if
P
(
Li
(
pi,p−i
)≤Li (Pi \ pi,p−i))>P(Li (p′i,p−i)≤Li (Pi \ p′i,p−i)), ∀p−i ∈P−i. (5)
Consider path pi ∈Pi strictly dominates path p′i ∈Pi for player i; then, for any σ−i ∈Σ−i
P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)≤Li(Pi \ pi,σ−i)
)
(a)
=
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
P
(
Li(pi,p−i)≤Li(Pi \ pi,p−i)
) ·σ(p−i)
)
(b)
>
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
P
(
Li(p′i,p−i)≤Li(Pi \ p′i,p−i)
) ·σ(p−i)
)
= P
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)≤L
i
(Pi \ p′i,σ−i)
)
,
(6)
where (a) is true by the law of total probability, σ(p−i) =
∏
j∈[n]\i σj(pj) and pj is the corresponding
strategy of player j in p−i, and (b) is followed by Equation (5) in Definition 3. By Equation (6)
and Equation (3) in Definition 1, a strictly dominated pure strategy cannot be a best response to
any mixed strategy profile σ−i ∈Σ−i, so it can be removed from the set of strategies of player i.
In order to find the risk-averse equilibrium for a stochastic congestion game, we use support
enumeration. For example, hypothesize that P ′ := {P ′1,P ′2, . . . ,P ′n} is the support of a risk-averse
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equilibrium, where P ′i is the set of pure strategies of player i that are played with non-zero proba-
bility and σi(pi) for pi ∈P ′i indicates the probability mass function on the support. At equilibrium,
player i ∈ [n] should be indifferent between strategies in the set P ′i, has no incentive to deviate to
the rest of strategies in the set Pi \P ′i, and the probability mass function over the support should
add to one. As a result, if there is a risk-averse equilibrium with the mentioned support, it is the
solution of the following set of equations for σ ∈Σ:
P
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)≤L
i
(Pi \ p′i,σ−i)
)
≥ P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)≤Li(Pi \ pi,σ−i)
)
,∀pi ∈Pi, p′i ∈P ′i,∀i∈ [n],∑
pi∈P′i
σi(pi) = 1,∀i∈ [n],
σi(pi) = 0,∀pi ∈Pi \P ′i,∀i∈ [n].
(7)
As mentioned earlier in Equation (6), using the law of total probability, we have
P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)≤Li(Pi \ pi,σ−i)
)
=
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
P
(
Li(pi,p−i)≤Li(Pi \ pi,p−i)
) ·σ(p−i)
)
=
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
ti(pi,p−i) ·σ(p−i)
)
,
(8)
where ti(pi,p−i) := P
(
Li(pi,p−i)≤Li(Pi \ pi,p−i)
)
is the i-th element of an n-dimensional vector
called t(pi,p−i). Construct a risk-averse probability tensor of rank n where Pi forms the i-th
dimension of the tensor. Let the element associated with (pi,p−i) in the tensor be the vector
t(pi,p−i). Equations (7) and (8) along with the definition of the risk-averse probability tensor
provide us with an alternative approach for deriving the risk-averse equilibrium, which is to find
the Wardrop (Nash) equilibrium on the risk-averse probability tensor.
The mean-variance (MV) and conditional value at risk level α (CVaRα) methods are two well-
known frameworks to consider risk in statistics. In the next two sub-sections, two new risk-averse
equilibria based on these two concepts are proposed.
4.3. Mean-Variance Equilibrium
As seen in Examples 1 and 2, the high variance of paths with lower expected travel time can result
in uncertainty and impose high latency for travelers. The mean-variance framework in statistics
addresses this issue by keeping a balance between low latency and low variance. Applying this
method to the proposed stochastic congestion game setting, the mean-variance best response and
mean-variance equilibrium are defined as follows.
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Definition 4. Given the mixed strategy profile σ−i of players [n] \ i, the set of mixed strategy
mean-variance best responses of player i is the set of all probability distributions over the set
arg min
pi∈Pi
Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i), (9)
where the variance Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
can be calculated using the pdf of L
i
(pi,σ−i) provided in
Equation (1) and ρ≥ 0 is a hyper-parameter capturing the absolute risk tolerance. Given the mixed
strategy σ−i of players [n]\ i, the mean-variance best response set of player i’s strategies is denoted
by MB(σ−i), which is in general a set-valued function.
Definition 5. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2 , . . . , σ
∗
N) is a mean-variance equilibrium if and
only if σ∗i ∈MB(σ∗−i) for all i∈ [n].
The existence of the mean-variance equilibrium is discussed in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For any finite n-player stochastic congestion game, a mean-variance equilibrium
exists.
The proof of Theorem 2 is provided in Appendix B.
The pure strategy mean-variance best response of player i to the pure strategy p−i of players
[n] \ i is the set
arg min
pi∈Pi
Var
(
Li(pi,p−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,p−i), (10)
where Var
(
Li(pi,p−i)
)
= Var
(∑
e∈pi Le(pi,p−i)
)
=
∑
e∈pi
∑
e′∈pi Cov
(
Le(pi,p−i),Le′(pi,p−i)
)
.
Given the pure strategy p−i of players [n]\i, the mean-variance best response set of player i in Equa-
tion (10) is denoted by MB(p−i) (overloading notation, MB(.) is used for both pure and mixed
strategy mean-variance best responses). As a result, a pure strategy profile p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2, . . . , p
∗
n) is
a pure strategy mean-variance equilibrium if and only if p∗i ∈MB(p∗−i) for all i ∈ [n]. The strict
dominance concept is straightforward among pure strategy profiles in mean-variance equilibrium
that is defined as follows. A pure strategy pi ∈ Pi of player i strictly dominates a second pure
strategy p′i ∈Pi of the player in pure strategy mean-variance equilibrium if
Var
(
Li(pi,p−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,p−i)<Var
(
Li(p′i,p−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,p−i), ∀p−i ∈P−i. (11)
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However, due to the fact that variance is not a linear operator, strict dominance may not be derived
from Equation (11) for mixed strategy mean-variance equilibrium as described below.
Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i)
(a)
= E
[(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)2]
−
(
l
i
(pi,σ−i)
)2
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i)
(b)
=
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) ·E
[(
Li(pi,p−i)
)2])−
 ∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · li(pi,p−i)
)2
+ ρ
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · li(pi,p−i)
)
(c)
=
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) ·E
[(
Li(pi,p−i)
)2])
−
∑
p−i∈P−i
 ∑
p′−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) ·σ(p′−i) · li(pi,p−i) · li(pi,p′−i)
)+ ρ · ∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · li(pi,p−i)
)
(d)
=
∑
p−i∈P−i
σ(p−i) ·
E[(Li(pi,p−i))2]− li(pi,p−i) · ∑
p′−i∈P−i
(
σ(p′−i) · li(pi,p′−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,p−i)

=
∑
p−i∈P−i
σ(p−i) ·
E[(Li(pi,p−i))2]− li(pi,p−i) ·
 ∑
p′−i∈P−i
(
σ(p′−i) · li(pi,p′−i)
)
+ ρ
 ,
(12)
where (a) is true by the definition of variance, (b) is followed by Equation (2), (c) is derived by
expanding the second term, and (d) is true by combining the summation over p−i ∈ P−i and
factoring σ(p−i). As can be seen in Equation (12), since variance is a non-linear operator, it is not
clear whether Equation (11) can result in Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i) < Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
)
+
ρ · li(p′i,σ−i) for all σ−i ∈Σ−i. As a result, use of strict dominance in the mixed strategy mean-
variance equilibrium is not advised. In certain circumstances though, we can propose conditions
for strict dominance; e.g., when li(p)≤ ρ
2
for all p∈P and for all i∈ [n] which is discussed in the
following definition or when li(p)≥ ρ
2
for all p∈P and for all i∈ [n].
Definition 6. If li(p) ≤ ρ
2
for all p ∈ P and for all i ∈ [n], pure strategy pi ∈ Pi of player i
strictly dominates a second pure strategy p′i ∈Pi of the player in the mean-variance equilibrium if
li
(
pi,p−i
)
< li
(
p′i,p−i
)
, ∀p−i ∈P−i, (13)
and
E
[(
Li
(
pi,p−i
))2]
<E
[(
Li
(
p′i,p−i
))2]
, ∀p−i ∈P−i. (14)
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Consider that path pi ∈Pi strictly dominates path p′i ∈Pi for player i as defined in Definition 6;
then, using Equation (13), for any σ−i ∈Σ−i,
l
i
(pi,σ−i) =
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · li(pi,p−i)
)
<
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) · li(p′i,p−i)
)
= l
i
(p′i,σ−i). (15)
Note that l
i
(pi,σ−i)≤ ρ2 for all pi ∈Pi, for all σ−i ∈Σ−i, and for all i∈ [n] as a result of li(p)≤ ρ2
for all p∈P and for all i∈ [n]. Hence, using the fact that the function −f2 +ρ · f is increasing for
f ≤ ρ
2
, for any σ−i ∈Σ−i we have
−
(
l
i
(pi,σ−i)
)2
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i)<−
(
l
i
(p′i,σ−i)
)2
+ ρ · li(p′i,σ−i). (16)
On the other hand, using Equation (14), we have
E
[(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)2]
=
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) ·E
[(
Li(pi,p−i)
)2])
<
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) ·E
[(
Li(p′i,p−i)
)2])
= E
[(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
)2]
.
(17)
Finally, Equations (16) and (17) conclude that Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i) <
Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,σ−i) for all σ−i ∈Σ−i.
In order to find the mean-variance equilibrium for a stochastic congestion game, we use support
enumeration. For example, hypothesize P ′ := {P ′1,P ′2, . . . ,P ′n} to be the support of a mean-variance
equilibrium, where P ′i is the set of pure strategies of player i that are played with non-zero proba-
bility and σi(pi) for pi ∈P ′i indicates the probability mass function on the support. At equilibrium,
player i ∈ [n] should be indifferent between strategies in the set P ′i, has no incentive to deviate to
the rest of strategies in the set Pi \P ′i, and the probability mass function over the support should
add to one. As a result, if there is a mean-variance equilibrium with the mentioned support, it is
the solution of the following set of equations for σ ∈Σ:
Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,σ−i)≤Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i),∀pi ∈Pi, p′i ∈P ′i,∀i∈ [n],∑
pi∈P′i
σi(pi) = 1,∀i∈ [n],
σi(pi) = 0,∀pi ∈Pi \P ′i,∀i∈ [n].
(18)
4.4. CVaRα Equilibrium
The conditional value at risk level α (CVaRα) is another framework in statistics to measure risk and
to address the risk-averse behavior. Applying this method to the proposed stochastic congestion
game setting, the CVaRα best response and CVaRα equilibrium are defined below.
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Definition 7. Given the mixed strategy profile σ−i of players [n] \ i, the set of mixed strategy
CVaRα best responses of player i is the set of all probability distributions over the set
arg min
pi∈Pi
CV aRα
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
= arg min
pi∈Pi
E
[
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,σ−i)≥ viα(pi,σ−i)] , (19)
where viα(pi,σ−i) is a constant derived by solving the equality P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)≥ viα(pi,σ−i)
)
= α
and the constant 0<α≤ 1 is a hyper-parameter depicting the risk level. Given the mixed strategy
σ−i of players [n] \ i, the CVaRα best response set of player i’s strategies is denoted by CB(σ−i),
which is in general a set-valued function.
Definition 8. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2 , . . . , σ
∗
N) is a CVaRα equilibrium if and only if
σ∗i ∈CB(σ∗−i) for all i∈ [n].
The existence of the CVaRα equilibrium is discussed in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. For any finite n-player stochastic congestion game, a CVaRα equilibrium exists.
The proof of Theorem 3 is provided in Appendix C.
The pure strategy CVaRα best response of player i to the pure strategy p−i of players [n] \ i is
the set
arg min
pi∈Pi
CV aRα
(
Li(pi,p−i)
)
= arg min
pi∈Pi
E
[
Li(pi,p−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,p−i)≥ viα(pi,p−i)] , (20)
where viα(pi,p−i) is a constant derived by solving the equality P
(
Li(pi,p−i)≥ viα(pi,p−i)
)
= α and
the constant 0<α≤ 1 is the hyper-parameter depicting risk level. Given the pure strategy p−i of
players [n] \ i, the CVaRα best response set of player i in Equation (20) is denoted by CB(p−i)
(overloading notation, CB(.) is used for both pure and mixed strategy CVaRα best responses). As
a result, a pure strategy profile p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2, . . . , p
∗
n) is a pure strategy CVaRα equilibrium if and
only if p∗i ∈CB(p∗−i) for all i ∈ [n]. A pure strategy pi ∈Pi of player i strictly dominates a second
pure strategy p′i ∈Pi of the player in pure strategy CVaRα equilibrium if
E
[
Li(pi,p−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,p−i)≥ viα(pi,p−i)]<E[Li(p′i,p−i)∣∣∣Li(p′i,p−i)≥ viα(p′i,p−i)] , ∀p−i ∈P−i,
(21)
where viα(pi,p−i) and v
i
α(p
′
i,p−i) are constants derived by solving P
(
Li(pi,p−i)≥ viα(pi,p−i)
)
=
α and P
(
Li(p′i,p−i)≥ viα(p′i,p−i)
)
= α, and the constant 0 < α ≤ 1 is the risk level hyper-
parameter. However, similar to the mean-variance equilibrium, strict dominance may not be
derived from Equation (21) for mixed strategy CVaRα equilibrium as described below. Us-
ing Equation (1) and P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)≥ viα(pi,σ−i)
)
= α, the distribution of the random variable(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,σ−i)≥ viα(pi,σ−i)) is ∑
p−i∈P−i
(
f i(x|(pi,p−i)) ·σ(p−i)
)/
α
 ·1{x≥ viα(pi,σ−i)} . (22)
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As a result,
E
[
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,σ−i)≥ viα(pi,σ−i)]
(a)
=
1
α
·
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) ·
∫ ∞
−∞
(
x · f i(x|(pi,p−i)) ·1
{
x≥ viα(pi,σ−i)
})
dx
)
(b)
=
1
α
·
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) ·P
(
Li(pi,p−i)≥ viα(pi,σ−i)
)×
∫ ∞
viα(pi,σ−i)
(
x · f
i(x|(pi,p−i))
P
(
Li(pi,p−i)≥ viα(pi,σ−i)
))dx)
=
1
α
·
∑
p−i∈P−i
(
σ(p−i) ·P
(
Li(pi,p−i)≥ viα(pi,σ−i)
) ·E[Li(pi,p−i)∣∣∣Li(pi,p−i)≥ viα(pi,σ−i)]) ,
(23)
where (a) is true by using the pdf of the corresponding random variable in Equation (22) and
switching the order of summation and integral and (b) is true by multiplying and dividing by the
term P
(
Li(pi,p−i)≥ viα(pi,σ−i)
)
. As can be seen in Equation (23), it is not clear whether Equation
(21) can result in E
[
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,σ−i)≥ viα(pi,σ−i)]<E[Li(p′i,σ−i)∣∣∣Li(p′i,σ−i)≥ viα(p′i,σ−i)]
for all σ−i ∈Σ−i. As a result, use of strict dominance in the mixed strategy CVaRα equilibrium is
not advised due to its complication.
In order to find the CVaRα equilibrium for a stochastic congestion game, we use support enumer-
ation. For example, hypothesize P ′ := {P ′1,P ′2, . . . ,P ′n} to be the support of a CVaRα equilibrium,
where P ′i is the set of pure strategies of player i that are played with non-zero probability and
σi(pi) for pi ∈ P ′i indicates the probability mass function on the support. At equilibrium, player
i∈ [n] should be indifferent between strategies in the set P ′i, has no incentive to deviate to the rest
of strategies in the set Pi \ P ′i, and the probability mass function over the support should add to
one. As a result, if there is a CVaRα equilibrium with the mentioned support, it is the solution of
the following set of equations for σ ∈Σ:
E
[
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(p′i,σ−i)≥ viα(p′i,σ−i)]
≤E
[
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,σ−i)≥ viα(pi,σ−i)] ,∀pi ∈Pi, p′i ∈P ′i,∀i∈ [n],∑
pi∈P′i
σi(pi) = 1,∀i∈ [n],
σi(pi) = 0,∀pi ∈Pi \P ′i,∀i∈ [n].
(24)
Remark 1. It is noteworthy that the polynomial terms in Equation (7) for the risk-averse
equilibrium are of degree n−1 while the polynomial terms in Equation (18) for the mean-variance
equilibrium are of degree 2(n−1) for n number of players. On the other hand, it is more complicated
to solve for Equation (24) as the top α quantile of distributions should be calculated.
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5. Numerical Results
The risk-averse, mean-variance, and CVaRα equilibria are numerically analyzed for Examples 1
and 2 in this section. The price of anarchy for each of the mentioned equilibria is calculated as
well. In the end, extra examples are presented to shed light on the corner cases of each one of the
equilibria and to provide insight on how to tackle such circumstances.
In order to find any of the three types of pure equilibria for the Pigou network in Example 1
with n players, hypothesize that m1 players choose link 1 and m2 = n−m1 players choose link 2
and check whether any players has any incentive in the corresponding sense of the equilibrium of
the interest to change route, given the pure strategy of the other players. If none of the players
has any incentive to change route given the pure strategy of the rest of players, (m1, n−m1) is a
pure equilibrium, where (m1,m2) denotes that m1 players select link 1 and m2 players select link
2. By varying m1 from zero to n and taking the above procedure, the pure equilibrium is found if
any exists. Given a fixed number of players m1 that choose link 1, it is obvious that they all have
the same incentive to change to link 2 or stay in link 1, and all of the m2 = n−m1 players have
the same incentive to change to link 1 or stay in link 2. As a result, if a specific player out of the
m1 players has no incentive to switch to link 2 given the pure strategy of the other players, and a
specific player out of the m2 players has no incentive to switch to link 1 given the pure strategy of
the other players, (m1,m2 = n−m1) is a pure equilibrium. In other words, (m1,m2 = n−m1) is a
pure risk-averse equilibrium if P
(
L1(m1)≤L2(m2 + 1)
)≥ 0.5,
P
(
L2(m2)≤L1(m1 + 1)
)≥ 0.5, (25)
where the first inequality is true since each player has two options, link 1 and link 2, so P
(
L1(m1)≤
L2(m2 + 1)
) ≥ P (L2(m2 + 1) ≤ L1(m1)), and since random variables are continuous we have
P
(
L1(m1) ≤ L2(m2 + 1)
)
+ P
(
L2(m2 + 1) ≤ L1(m1)
)
= 1, which results in P
(
L1(m1) ≤ L2(m2 +
1)
)≥ 0.5. The second inequality is true due to a similar reasoning. By varying m1 from zero to n,
if Equation (25) holds for (m1,m2 = n−m1), it is a pure risk-averse equilibrium.
Similar to the above approach, (m1,m2 = n−m1) is a pure mean-variance equilibrium ifVar
(
L1(m1)
)
+ ρ · l1(m1)≤Var
(
L2(m2 + 1)
)
+ ρ · l2(m2 + 1),
Var
(
L2(m2)
)
+ ρ · l2(m2)≤Var
(
L1(m1 + 1)
)
+ ρ · l1(m1 + 1).
(26)
Again, by varying m1 from zero to n, if Equation (26) holds for (m1,m2 = n−m1), it is a pure
mean-variance equilibrium. Similarly, (m1,m2 = n−m1) is a pure CVaRα equilibrium ifE
[
L1(m1)
∣∣L1(m1)≥ v1α(m1)]≤E[L2(m2 + 1)∣∣L2(m2 + 1)≥ v2α(m2 + 1)],
E
[
L2(m2)
∣∣L2(m2)≥ v2α(m2)]≤E[L1(m1 + 1)∣∣L1(m1 + 1)≥ v1α(m1 + 1)], (27)
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Figure 3 The pure risk-averse, mean-variance (ρ= 1), CVaRα (α= 0.1), and Nash equilibria of the Pigou network
in Example 1 are denoted for different numbers of players.
where P
(
L1(m1) ≥ v1α(m1)
)
= P
(
L2(m2 + 1) ≥ v2α(m2 + 1)
)
= P
(
L2(m2) ≥ v2α(m2)
)
= P
(
L1(m1 +
1)≥ v1α(m1 + 1)
)
= α. By varying m1 from zero to n, if Equation (27) holds for (m1,m2 = n−m1),
it is a pure CVaRα equilibrium.
Note that the equilibrium in the Pigou network in Example 1 is characterized by m1, since
m2 can be derived given m1. The pure risk-averse, mean-variance (ρ = 1), and CVaRα (α = 0.1)
equilibria are found for the mentioned Pigou network and the proportion of players who select
link 1, i.e., m1
n
, is depicted in Figure 3 for different values of n. Under the Nash equilibrium, no
matter what the probability distributions of latency over links look like, all players select link 1 as
it has less or equal latency in expectation. Hence, (n,0) is the Nash equilibrium for all n, which
corresponds to m1
n
= 1 as depicted in Figure 3.
The social delay/latency defined as the expected average delay/latency incurred by the n
players in the Pigou network in Example 1 under the pure strategy (m1,m2) is D(m1) =
1
n
(
m1 · m1n + (n−m1)
)
=
(
m1
n
)2 − m1
n
+ 1, which is minimized when m1 =
n
2
for an even n, and
m1 = bn2 c and m1 = dn2 e for an odd n. As a result, it is socially optimal that about half of the
players take the top link and the rest take the bottom link to travel from source to destination in
the Pigou network, which results in a social latency close to 3
4
for n 1. If players are risk-neutral
and seek to minimize their expected latency given the strategy of the rest of players, which is how
the Nash equilibrium models games, the social latency in the mentioned Pigou network equals to
one for the Nash equilibrium (n,0). In contrast, if players are risk-averse in the different senses
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Figure 4 The prices of anarchy for the risk-averse, mean-variance (ρ= 1), CVaRα (α= 0.1), and Nash equilibria
of the Pigou network in Example 1 are plotted for different numbers of players.
discussed in this article, the social latency decreases compared to when players are risk-neutral; as
a result, the price of anarchy decreases as depicted in Figure 4. In this example, it is to the benefit
of the society if players are risk-averse, which is the case as numerous studies in prospect theory
discuss the fact that players in the real world often behave in a risk-averse manner.
Considering the Pigou network in a non-atomic setting, which corresponds to the case with in-
finite number of players, the socially optimal strategy is (0.5,0.5) with social latency of 3
4
, where
(u1, u2) corresponds to u1 fraction of players traveling along link 1 and u2 = 1−u1 fraction of players
traveling along link 2. We numerically calculate that the risk-averse equilibrium is (0.7303,0.2697)
with PoA = 1.0707, the mean-variance equilibrium with ρ= 1 is (0.7750,0.2250) with PoA = 1.1008,
the CVaRα equilibrium with α= 0.1 is (0.6822,0.3178) with PoA = 1.0442, and the Nash equilib-
rium is (1,0) with PoA = 4
3
.
In the Braess network in Example 2, there are three paths from source to destination, p1 = (1,2),
p2 = (1,5,4), p3 = (3,4), where links SA,AD,SB,BD, and AB are denoted with 1,2,3,4, and
5, respectively. In order to find the three types of pure equilibria for the Braess network with n
players, hypothesize that m1 players select path p1, m
2 players select path p2, and n−m1 −m2
players select path p3, then check whether any players has any incentive in the corresponding sense
of the equilibrium of the interest to change route, given the pure strategy of the other players. If
none of the players has any incentive to change route given the pure strategy of the rest of players,
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(m1,m2, n−m1−m2) is a pure equilibrium. As a result, (m1,m2, n−m1−m2) is a pure risk-averse
equilibrium if
P
(
L1 ≤ {L2,L3})≥ {P (L2 ≤ {L1,L3}), P (L3 ≤ {L1,L2})},
where L1 =L1(m
1 +m2) +L2(m
1),L2 =L1(m
1 +m2) +L4(n−m1 + 1),and
L3 =L3(n−m1−m2 + 1) +L4(n−m1 + 1),
P
(
L2 ≤ {L1,L3})≥ {P (L1 ≤ {L2,L3}), P (L3 ≤ {L1,L2})},
where L1 =L1(m
1 +m2) +L2(m
1 + 1),L2 =L1(m
1 +m2) +L4(n−m1),and
L3 =L3(n−m1−m2 + 1) +L4(n−m1),
P
(
L3 ≤ {L1,L2})≥ {P (L1 ≤ {L2,L3}), P (L2 ≤ {L1,L3})},
where L1 =L1(m
1 +m2 + 1) +L2(m
1 + 1),L2 =L1(m
1 +m2 + 1) +L4(n−m1),and
L3 =L3(n−m1−m2) +L4(n−m1).
(28)
By varying m1 from zero to n and m2 from 0 to n−m1, if Equation (28) holds for (m1,m2,m3 =
n−m1−m2), it is a pure risk-averse equilibrium.
Similar to the above approach, (m1,m2, n−m1−m2) is a pure mean-variance equilibrium if
Var(L1) + ρ ·E(L1)≤ {Var(L2) + ρ ·E(L2),Var(L3) + ρ ·E(L3)},
where L1 =L1(m
1 +m2) +L2(m
1),L2 =L1(m
1 +m2) +L4(n−m1 + 1),and
L3 =L3(n−m1−m2 + 1) +L4(n−m1 + 1),
Var(L2) + ρ ·E(L2)≤ {Var(L1) + ρ ·E(L1),Var(L3) + ρ ·E(L3)},
where L1 =L1(m
1 +m2) +L2(m
1 + 1),L2 =L1(m
1 +m2) +L4(n−m1),and
L3 =L3(n−m1−m2 + 1) +L4(n−m1),
Var(L3) + ρ ·E(L3)≤ {Var(L1) + ρ ·E(L1),Var(L2) + ρ ·E(L2)},
where L1 =L1(m
1 +m2 + 1) +L2(m
1 + 1),L2 =L1(m
1 +m2 + 1) +L4(n−m1),and
L3 =L3(n−m1−m2) +L4(n−m1).
(29)
By varying m1 from zero to n and m2 from 0 to n−m1, if Equation (29) holds for (m1,m2,m3 =
n−m1−m2), it is a pure risk-averse equilibrium.
Similar to the above approach, (m1,m2, n−m1−m2) is a pure CVaRα equilibrium if
E
[
L1
∣∣L1 ≥ v1α]≤ {E[L2∣∣L2 ≥ v2α],E[L3∣∣L3 ≥ v3α]},
where L1 =L1(m
1 +m2) +L2(m
1),L2 =L1(m
1 +m2) +L4(n−m1 + 1),
L3 =L3(n−m1−m2 + 1) +L4(n−m1 + 1), and P
(
L1 ≥ v1α
)
= P
(
L2 ≥ v2α
)
= P
(
L3 ≥ v3α
)
= α
E
[
L2
∣∣L2 ≥ v2α]≤ {E[L1∣∣L1 ≥ v1α],E[L3∣∣L3 ≥ v3α]},
where L1 =L1(m
1 +m2) +L2(m
1 + 1),L2 =L1(m
1 +m2) +L4(n−m1),
L3 =L3(n−m1−m2 + 1) +L4(n−m1), and P
(
L1 ≥ v1α
)
= P
(
L2 ≥ v2α
)
= P
(
L3 ≥ v3α
)
= α
E
[
L3
∣∣L3 ≥ v3α]≤ {E[L1∣∣L1 ≥ v1α],E[L2∣∣L2 ≥ v2α]},
where L1 =L1(m
1 +m2 + 1) +L2(m
1 + 1),L2 =L1(m
1 +m2 + 1) +L4(n−m1),
L3 =L3(n−m1−m2) +L4(n−m1), and P
(
L1 ≥ v1α
)
= P
(
L2 ≥ v2α
)
= P
(
L3 ≥ v3α
)
= α.
(30)
By varying m1 from zero to n and m2 from 0 to n−m1, if Equation (30) holds for (m1,m2,m3 =
n−m1−m2), it is a pure CVaRα equilibrium.
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Figure 5 The pure risk-averse, mean-variance (ρ= 1), CVaRα (α= 0.1), and Nash equilibria of the Braess network
in Example 2 are denoted for different numbers of players.
Note that the equilibrium in the Braess network in Example 2 is characterized by m1 and m2,
since m3 can be derived given m1 and m2. The pure risk-averse, mean-variance (ρ= 1), and CVaRα
(α = 0.1) equilibria are found for the mentioned Braess network and the proportions of players
who select paths 1 and 2, i.e., m
1
n
and m
2
n
, are depicted in Figure 5 for different values of n. Under
the Nash equilibrium, no matter what the probability distributions of latency over links look like,
all players select path 2 as it has less or equal latency in expectation. Hence, (0, n,0) is the Nash
equilibrium for all n, which corresponds to m
2
n
= 1 and m
1
n
= m
3
n
= 0 as depicted in Figure 5.
The social delay/latency defined as the expected average delay/latency incurred by the
n players in the Braess network in Example 2 under the pure strategy (m1,m2,m3 = n −
m1 − m2) is D(m1,m2) = 1
n
·
(
(m1 +m2) · (m1+m2)
n
+m1 + (n−m1−m2) + (n−m1) · (n−m1)
n
)
=
1
n2
·
(
2 (m1)
2
+ (m2)
2
+ 2m1m2− 2nm1−nm2 + 2n2
)
, which is minimized when(
m1 = bn
2
c,m2 = 0,m3 = n−m1) or (m1 = dn
2
e,m2 = 0,m3 = n−m1). As a result, it is socially
optimal that about half of players take path p1 and the rest take path p3 to travel from source to
destination in the Braess network, which results in a social latency close to 3
2
for n 1. If players
are risk-neutral and seek to minimize their expected latency given the strategy of the rest of the
players, which is how the Nash equilibrium models games, the social latency in the mentioned
Braess network equals two for the Nash equilibrium (0, n,0). In contrast, if players are risk-averse
in the different senses discussed in this article, the social latency decreases compared to when
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Figure 6 The prices of anarchy for the risk-averse, mean-variance (ρ= 1), CVaRα (α= 0.1), and Nash equilibria
of the Braess network in Example 2 are plotted for different numbers of players.
players are risk-neutral; as a result, the price of anarchy decreases as depicted in Figure 6. In this
example, it is again to the benefit of the society if players are risk-averse.
Considering the Braess network in a non-atomic setting, which corresponds to the case with
infinite number of players, the socially optimal strategy is (0.5,0,0.5) with social latency of 3
2
, where
(u1, u2, u3) corresponds to u1 fraction of players travel along path p1, u
2 fraction of players travel
along path p2, and u
3 = 1−u1−u2 fraction of players travel along path p3. We numerically calculate
that the risk-averse equilibrium is (0.2655,0.4690,0.2655) with PoA = 1.0733, the mean-variance
equilibrium with ρ= 1 is (0.1716,0.6568,0.1716) with PoA = 1.1438, the CVaRα equilibrium with
α = 0.1 is (0.3045,0.3910,0.3045) with PoA = 1.0509, and the Nash equilibrium is (0,1,0) with
PoA = 4
3
.
Although it is more prevalent to use pure equilibrium for congestion games, we analyze the
mixed equilibrium of the Pigou network in Example 1 for two players. The underlying stochastic
congestion game with the probability distributions of players’ delays, the pure and mixed Nash,
risk-averse, mean-variance, and CVaR equilibria are depicted in Figure 7. Recall that the (pure)
price of anarchy of a congestion game is the maximum ratio D(p)/D(o) over all equilibria p of
the game, where o is the socially optimum strategy. As mentioned earlier, the optimum strategy
for the Pigou network with two players is that one of the players travels along the top link and
the other player travels along the bottom link which corresponds to the social delay of 3
4
. As a
result, the (pure) price of anarchy for the Nash equilibria is 4
3
. On the other hand, the pure price
of anarchy for the risk-averse, mean-variance, and CVaR equilibria is equal to one. Furthermore,
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Figure 7 The pure and mixed risk-averse, mean-variance (ρ= 1), CVaRα (α= 0.1), and Nash equilibria of the
Pigou network in Example 1 for two players.
the price of anarchy among both pure and mixed equilibria for the risk-averse, mean-variance, and
CVaR equilibria is 1.2405, 1.1689, and 1.2897, respectively.
In the following, we present extra examples with the purpose of shedding light on drawbacks of
the different equilibria in different scenarios and motivating more work to be done on a unified risk-
averse framework. Furthermore, the following examples suggest that careful consideration should
be given to the choice of the equilibrium that best fits the application of the interest.
5.1. Notes for Practitioners
The intention of this subsection is to direct the attention of practitioners planning to implement
risk-averse in-vehicle navigation to cases in which each of the proposed risk-averse equilibria may
provide travelers with counterintuitive guidance. To this end, three examples are discussed in the
following to shed light on the implications of the three classes of risk-averse equilibria. The examples
are meant to be simple to convey the idea in a straightforward manner.
Example 3. Consider a Pigou network with two parallel links, 1 and 2, between source and
destination. The travel times on links 1 and 2 are respectively independent random variables L1
and L2 with pdfs
f1(x) = α
(
exp
(
−100 (x− 14)2
)
·1{13≤ x≤ 15}+ exp
(
−100 (x− 19)2
)
·1{18≤ x≤ 20}
)
,
f2(x) = βexp
(
−100 (x− 20)2
)
·1{19≤ x≤ 21} ,
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where α and β are constants for which each of the two distributions integrate to one.
In Example 3, the means and variances of travel times along links 1 and 2 are l1 = 16.5, Var(L1) =
6.255, l2 = 20.0, Var(L2) = 0.005, respectively, and P (L1 ≤ L2) = 1.0. As a result, although link
1 has a higher variance than link 2, not only is link 1 shorter than link 2 in expectation, but
link 1 is shorter than link 2 almost certainly. Hence, a rational traveler intends to take link 1 for
commute although its variance is higher than the variance of link 2. However, the mean-variance
framework intends to keep a balance between lower expected travel time and lower uncertainty in
travel time assuming that higher variance is against the spirit of risk-averse travelers. In Example
3, the mean-variance framework guides travelers to travel along link 2 if ρ < 1.7857, which is not
optimal from the perspective of a risk-averse traveler. Note that both risk-averse equilibrium and
CVaRα equilibrium for any α∈ [0,1] guide travelers to traverse along link 1 in this example.
Example 4. Consider a Pigou network with two parallel links, 1 and 2, between source and
destination. The travel times on links 1 and 2 are respectively independent random variables L1
and L2 with pdfs
f1(x) = α
(
4exp
(
−100 (x− 5)2
)
·1{4≤ x≤ 6}+ exp
(
−100 (x− 10)2
)
·1{9≤ x≤ 11}
)
,
f2(x) = β
(
4exp
(
−100 (x− 8)2
)
·1{7≤ x≤ 9}+ exp
(
−100 (x− 10)2
)
·1{9≤ x≤ 11}
)
,
where α and β are constants for which each of the two distributions integrate to one.
In Example 4, the means and variances of travel times along links 1 and 2 are l1 = 6.0, Var(L1) =
4.005, l2 = 8.4, Var(L2) = 0.645, respectively, and P (L1 ≤L2) = 0.82. Note that both distributions
are the same over the interval [9,11]; however, the traveler has a better opportunity of experiencing
shorter travel time on the lower 0.8 quantile of the distribution of link 1 compared to that of link
2. Hence, a rational traveler intends to take link 1 for commute although its variance is higher
than the variance of link 2. Furthermore, E [L1|L1 ≥ α] = E [L2|L2 ≥ α] for α ∈ [0,0.2]; hence, the
CVaRα framework is indifferent between the two links when α ∈ [0,0.2], which can result in a
counterintuitive route selection in Example 4. The mean-variance framework also guides travelers
to traverse along link 2 if ρ< 1.4, which is not optimal from the perspective of a risk-averse traveler.
Note that the risk-averse equilibrium guides travelers to traverse along link 1 in this example as
P (L1 ≤L2) = 0.82.
Example 5. Consider a Pigou network with two parallel links, 1 and 2, between source and
destination. The travel times on links 1 and 2 are respectively independent random variables L1
and L2 with pdfs
f1(x) = βexp
(
−100 (x− 7)2
)
·1{6≤ x≤ 8} ,
f2(x) = α
(
7exp
(
−100 (x− 5)2
)
·1{4≤ x≤ 6}+ 3exp
(
−100 (x− 10)2
)
·1{9≤ x≤ 11}
)
,
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where α and β are constants for which each of the two distributions integrate to one.
In Example 5, the means and variances of travel times along links 1 and 2 are l1 = 7.0, Var(L1) =
0.005, l2 = 6.5, Var(L2) = 5.255, respectively, and P (L2 ≤ L1) = 0.7. Although the expected travel
time along link 2 is less than that along link 1 and it is more likely that the travel time along link
2 is shorter than travel time along link 1, the travel time along link 2 is concentrated around 10
with probability 0.3 which is somewhat larger than the concentration of travel time around 7 when
traveling along link 1. Hence, a risk-averse traveler may prefer to take link 1 for commute although
its expected travel time is higher than the expected travel time of link 2 to avoid a long travel
time. However, the risk-averse equilibrium guides travelers to traverse along link 2, which may not
be optimal from the perspective of a risk-averse traveler. Note that the CVaRα equilibrium for
α < 0.748 and mean-variance equilibrium for ρ < 10.5 guide travelers to traverse along link 1 in
this example.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
A stochastic atomic congestion game with incomplete information on travel times along arcs of
a traffic/telecommunication network is studied in this work from a risk-averse perspective. Risk-
averse travelers intend to make decisions based on probability statements regarding their travel
options rather than simply taking the average travel time into account. In order to put this into per-
spective, we propose three classes of equilibria, i.e., risk-averse equilibrium (RAE), mean-variance
equilibrium (MVE), and CVaRα equilibrium (CVaRαE). The MV and CVaRα equilibria are studied
in the literature for networks with simplifying assumptions such as that the probability distribu-
tions of link delays are load independent or link delays are independent, which are not the case
in this article. The notions of best responses in risk-averse, mean-variance, and CVaRα equilibria
are based on maximizing the probability of traveling along the shortest path, minimizing a linear
combination of mean and variance of path delay, and minimizing the expected delay at a specified
risky quantile of the delay distributions, respectively. We prove that the risk-averse, mean-variance,
and CVaRα equilibria exist for any finite stochastic atomic congestion game. Although proving
bounds on the price of anarchy (PoA) is not the focus of this work, we numerically study the
impact of risk-averse equilibria on PoA and observe that the Braess paradox may not occur to the
extent presented originally and the PoA may improve upon using any of the proposed equilibria
in both Braess and Pigou networks. Promising future directions are to study non-atomic, instead
of atomic, stochastic congestion games in the proposed three classes of equilibria in their general
case where the arc delay distributions are load dependent and not necessarily independent of each
other, to find bounds on the price of anarchy for the proposed three classes of equilibria, and to
find a unified class of equilibrium that captures risk-aversion for a broader class of travel time
distributions in traffic/telecommunication networks.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Let RB : Σ→Σ be the risk-averse best response function where RB(σ) = (RB(σ−1),RB(σ−2),
. . . ,RB(σ−N)
)
. It is easy to see that the existence of a fixed point σ∗ ∈ Σ for the risk-averse
best response function, i.e., σ∗ ∈RB(σ∗), proves the existence of a risk-averse equilibrium. The
following four conditions of the Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem are shown to be satisfied for the
function RB(σ) to prove the existence of a fixed point for the function.
1. The domain of function RB(.) is a non-empty, compact, and convex subset of a finite dimen-
sional Euclidean space: Σ is the Cartesian product of non-empty simplices as each player has
at least one strategy to play; furthermore, each of the elements of Σ is between zero and one,
so Σ is non-empty, convex, bounded, and closed containing all its limit points.
2. RB(σ) 6= ∅, ∀σ ∈ Σ: The set in Equation (3) is non-empty as maximum exists over a finite
number of values. As a result, RB(σ−i) is non-empty for all i ∈ [n] since it is the set of all
probability distributions over the corresponding mentioned non-empty set.
3. The co-domain of function RB(.) is a convex set for all σ ∈Σ: It suffices to prove that RB(σ−i)
is a convex set for all σ−i ∈Σ−i and for all i∈ [n]. For any i∈ [n], if σi, σ′i ∈RB(σ−i), we need to
prove that λσi + (1−λ)σ′i ∈RB(σ−i) for any λ∈ [0,1] and for any σ−i ∈Σ−i. Let the supports
of σi and σ
′
i be defined as supp(σi) = {pi ∈ Pi : σi(pi)> 0} and supp(σ′i) = {pi ∈ Pi : σ′i(pi)> 0},
respectively. It is concluded from the definition of the risk-averse best response in Definition 1
that supp(σi), supp(σ
′
i)⊆ arg max
pi∈Pi
P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)≤Li(Pi \ pi,σ−i)
)
, which results in supp(σi)∪
supp(σ′i) ⊆ arg max
pi∈Pi
P
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)≤Li(Pi \ pi,σ−i)
)
. As a result, using the definition of risk-
averse best response, any probability distribution over the set supp(σi)∪supp(σ′i) is a risk-averse
best response to σ−i. It is trivial that the mixed strategy λσi + (1−λ)σ′i is a valid probability
distribution over the set supp(σi)∪ supp(σ′i) for any λ∈ [0,1], so λσi + (1−λ)σ′i ∈RB(σ−i) for
any λ∈ [0,1] and for any σ−i ∈Σ−i that completes the convexity proof of the set RB(σ−i).
4. RB(σ) has a closed graph: RB(σ) has a closed graph if for any sequence {σm, σ̂m}→ {σ, σ̂}
with σ̂
m ∈RB(σm) for all m∈N, we have σ̂ ∈RB(σ). Proof by contradiction is used to show
that RB(σ) has a closed graph. Consider by contradiction that RB(σ) does not have a closed
graph, so there exists a sequence {σm, σ̂m} → {σ, σ̂} with σ̂m ∈RB(σm) for all m ∈ N, but
σ̂ /∈RB(σ). As a result, there exists some i∈ [n] such that σ̂i /∈RB(σ−i). Using the definition
of risk-averse best response in Definition 1, there exists p′i ∈ supp(RB(σ−i)), p̂i ∈ supp(σ̂i), and
some  > 0 such that
P
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)≤L
i
(Pi \ p′i,σ−i)
)
>P
(
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i)≤Li(Pi \ p̂i,σ−i)
)
+ 3. (31)
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Since the latencies over edges are continuous random variables and σm−i→ σ−i, for any  > 0,
there exists a sufficiently large m1 such that we have the following for m≥m1:
P
(
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i)≤L
i
(Pi \ p′i,σm−i)
)
>P
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)≤L
i
(Pi \ p′i,σ−i)
)
− . (32)
By adding inequalities with the same direction in Equations (31) and (32), for m≥m1 we have
P
(
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i)≤L
i
(Pi \ p′i,σm−i)
)
>P
(
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i)≤Li(Pi \ p̂i,σ−i)
)
+ 2. (33)
For the same reason as of Equation (32), for any  > 0, there exists a sufficiently large m2 such
that we have the following for m≥m2:
P
(
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i)≤Li(Pi \ p̂i,σ−i)
)
>P
(
L
i
(p̂mi ,σ
m
−i)≤L
i
(Pi \ p̂mi ,σm−i)
)
− , (34)
where p̂mi ∈ supp(RB(σm−i)). By adding the inequalities with the same direction in Equations
(33) and (34), for m≥max{m1,m2} we have
P
(
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i)≤L
i
(Pi \ p′i,σm−i)
)
>P
(
L
i
(p̂mi ,σ
m
−i)≤L
i
(Pi \ p̂mi ,σm−i)
)
+ . (35)
Equation (35) contradicts the fact that p̂mi ∈ supp(RB(σm−i)), which completes the proof that
RB(σ) has a closed graph.
As listed above, the risk-averse best response function RB(σ) satisfies the four conditions of
Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem. As a direct result, for any finite n-player stochastic congestion
game, there exists σ∗ ∈Σ such that σ∗ ∈RB(σ∗), which completes the existence proof of a risk-
averse equilibrium for such games. 
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Let MB : Σ → Σ be the mean-variance best response function where MB(σ) =(
MB(σ−1),MB(σ−2), . . . ,MB(σ−N)
)
. It is easy to see that the existence of a fixed point σ∗ ∈Σ
for the mean-variance best response function, i.e., σ∗ ∈MB(σ∗), proves the existence of a mean-
variance equilibrium. The following four conditions of the Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem are
shown to be satisfied for the function MB(σ) to prove the existence of a fixed point for the
function.
1. The domain of function MB(.) is a non-empty, compact, and convex subset of a finite dimen-
sional Euclidean space: Σ is the Cartesian product of non-empty simplices as each player has
at least one strategy to play; furthermore, each of the elements of Σ is between zero and one,
so Σ is non-empty, convex, bounded, and closed containing all its limit points.
2. MB(σ) 6= ∅, ∀σ ∈Σ: The set in Equation (9) is non-empty as minimum exists over a finite
number of values. As a result, MB(σ−i) is non-empty for all i ∈ [n] since it is the set of all
probability distributions over the corresponding mentioned non-empty set.
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3. The co-domain of functionMB(.) is a convex set for all σ ∈Σ: It suffices to prove thatMB(σ−i)
is a convex set for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i and for all i ∈ [n]. For any i ∈ [n], if σi, σ′i ∈MB(σ−i), we
need to prove that λσi + (1−λ)σ′i ∈MB(σ−i) for any λ∈ [0,1] and for any σ−i ∈Σ−i. Let the
supports of σi and σ
′
i be defined as supp(σi) = {pi ∈ Pi : σi(pi) > 0} and supp(σ′i) = {pi ∈ Pi :
σ′i(pi)> 0}, respectively. It is concluded from the definition of the mean-variance best response in
Definition 4 that supp(σi), supp(σ
′
i)⊆ arg min
pi∈Pi
Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
+ρ · li(pi,σ−i), which results in
supp(σi)∪ supp(σ′i)⊆ arg min
pi∈Pi
Var
(
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(pi,σ−i). As a result, using the definition
of mean-variance best response, any probability distribution over the set supp(σi)∪ supp(σ′i) is
a mean-variance best response to σ−i. The mixed strategy λσi + (1− λ)σ′i is obviously a valid
probability distribution over the set supp(σi)∪ supp(σ′i) for any λ ∈ [0,1], so λσi + (1− λ)σ′i ∈
MB(σ−i) for any λ∈ [0,1] and for any σ−i ∈Σ−i that completes the convexity proof of the set
MB(σ−i).
4. MB(σ) has a closed graph: MB(σ) has a closed graph if for any sequence {σm, σ̂m}→ {σ, σ̂}
with σ̂
m ∈MB(σm) for all m∈N, we have σ̂ ∈MB(σ). Proof by contradiction is used to show
that MB(σ) has a closed graph. Consider by contradiction that MB(σ) does not have a closed
graph, so there exists a sequence {σm, σ̂m} → {σ, σ̂} with σ̂m ∈MB(σm) for all m ∈ N, but
σ̂ /∈MB(σ). As a result, there exists some i∈ [n] such that σ̂i /∈MB(σ−i). Using the definition
of mean-variance best response in Definition 4, there exists p′i ∈ supp(MB(σ−i)), p̂i ∈ supp(σ̂i),
and some  > 0 such that
Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,σ−i)<Var
(
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p̂i,σ−i)− 3. (36)
Since the latencies over edges are continuous random variables and σm−i→ σ−i, for any  > 0,
there exists a sufficiently large m3 such that we have the following for m≥m3:
Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,σm−i)<Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,σ−i) + . (37)
By adding inequalities with the same direction in Equations (36) and (37), for m≥m3 we have
Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,σm−i)<Var
(
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p̂i,σ−i)− 2. (38)
For the same reason as of Equation (37), for any  > 0, there exists a sufficiently large m4 such
that we have the following for m≥m4:
Var
(
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p̂i,σ−i)<Var
(
L
i
(p̂mi ,σ
m
−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p̂mi ,σm−i) + , (39)
where p̂mi ∈ supp(MB(σm−i)). By adding the inequalities with the same direction in Equations
(38) and (39), for m≥max{m3,m4} we have
Var
(
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p′i,σm−i)<Var
(
L
i
(p̂mi ,σ
m
−i)
)
+ ρ · li(p̂mi ,σm−i)− . (40)
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Equation (40) contradicts the fact that p̂mi ∈ supp(MB(σm−i)), which completes the proof that
MB(σ) has a closed graph.
As listed above, the mean-variance best response function MB(σ) satisfies the four conditions of
Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem. As a direct result, for any finite n-player stochastic congestion
game, there exists σ∗ ∈ Σ such that σ∗ ∈MB(σ∗), which completes the existence proof of a
mean-variance equilibrium for such games. 
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Let CB : Σ→ Σ be the CVaRα best response function where CB(σ) =
(
CB(σ−1),CB(σ−2),
. . . ,CB(σ−N)
)
. It is easy to see that the existence of a fixed point σ∗ ∈Σ for the CVaRα best
response function, i.e., σ∗ ∈CB(σ∗), proves the existence of a CVaRα equilibrium. The following
four conditions of the Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem are shown to be satisfied for the function
CB(σ) to prove the existence of a fixed point for the function.
1. The domain of function CB(.) is a non-empty, compact, and convex subset of a finite dimen-
sional Euclidean space: Σ is the Cartesian product of non-empty simplices as each player has
at least one strategy to play; furthermore, each of the elements of Σ is between zero and one,
so Σ is non-empty, convex, bounded, and closed containing all its limit points.
2. CB(σ) 6= ∅, ∀σ ∈Σ: The set in Equation (19) is non-empty as minimum exists over a finite
number of values. As a result, CB(σ−i) is non-empty for all i ∈ [n] since it is the set of all
probability distributions over the corresponding mentioned non-empty set.
3. The co-domain of function CB(.) is a convex set for all σ ∈Σ: It suffices to prove that CB(σ−i)
is a convex set for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i and for all i ∈ [n]. For any i ∈ [n], if σi, σ′i ∈ CB(σ−i), we
need to prove that λσi + (1 − λ)σ′i ∈ CB(σ−i) for any λ ∈ [0,1] and for any σ−i ∈ Σ−i. Let
the supports of σi and σ
′
i be defined as supp(σi) = {pi ∈ Pi : σi(pi) > 0} and supp(σ′i) = {pi ∈
Pi : σ′i(pi) > 0}, respectively. It is concluded from the definition of the CVaRα best response
in Definition 7 that supp(σi), supp(σ
′
i)⊆ arg min
pi∈Pi
E
[
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,σ−i)≥ viα(pi,σ−i)], which
results in supp(σi) ∪ supp(σ′i) ⊆ arg min
pi∈Pi
E
[
L
i
(pi,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(pi,σ−i)≥ viα(pi,σ−i)]. As a result,
using the definition of CVaRα best response, any probability distribution over the set supp(σi)∪
supp(σ′i) is a CVaRα best response to σ−i. The mixed strategy λσi+(1−λ)σ′i is obviously a valid
probability distribution over the set supp(σi)∪ supp(σ′i) for any λ ∈ [0,1], so λσi + (1− λ)σ′i ∈
CB(σ−i) for any λ∈ [0,1] and for any σ−i ∈Σ−i that completes the convexity proof of the set
CB(σ−i).
4. CB(σ) has a closed graph: CB(σ) has a closed graph if for any sequence {σm, σ̂m}→ {σ, σ̂}
with σ̂
m ∈CB(σm) for all m∈N, we have σ̂ ∈CB(σ). Proof by contradiction is used to show
that CB(σ) has a closed graph. Consider by contradiction that CB(σ) does not have a closed
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graph, so there exists a sequence {σm, σ̂m} → {σ, σ̂} with σ̂m ∈CB(σm) for all m ∈ N, but
σ̂ /∈CB(σ). As a result, there exists some i∈ [n] such that σ̂i /∈CB(σ−i). Using the definition
of CVaRα best response in Definition 7, there exists p
′
i ∈ supp(CB(σ−i)), p̂i ∈ supp(σ̂i), and
some  > 0 such that
E
[
L
i
(p′i,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(p′i,σ−i)≥ viα(p′i,σ−i)]<E[Li(p̂i,σ−i)∣∣∣Li(p̂i,σ−i)≥ viα(p̂i,σ−i)]− 3. (41)
Since the latencies over edges are continuous random variables and σm−i→ σ−i, for any  > 0,
there exists a sufficiently large m5 such that we have the following for m≥m5:
E
[
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i)
∣∣∣Li(p′i,σm−i)≥ viα(p′i,σm−i)]<E[Li(p′i,σ−i)∣∣∣Li(p′i,σ−i)≥ viα(p′i,σ−i)]+ . (42)
By adding inequalities with the same direction in Equations (41) and (42), for m≥m5 we have
E
[
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i)
∣∣∣Li(p′i,σm−i)≥ viα(p′i,σm−i)]<E[Li(p̂i,σ−i)∣∣∣Li(p̂i,σ−i)≥ viα(p̂i,σ−i)]− 2. (43)
For the same reason as of Equation (42), for any  > 0, there exists a sufficiently large m6 such
that we have the following for m≥m6:
E
[
L
i
(p̂i,σ−i)
∣∣∣Li(p̂i,σ−i)≥ viα(p̂i,σ−i)]<E[Li(p̂mi ,σm−i)∣∣∣Li(p̂mi ,σm−i)≥ viα(p̂mi ,σm−i)]+ , (44)
where p̂mi ∈ supp(CB(σm−i)). By adding the inequalities with the same direction in Equations
(43) and (44), for m≥max{m5,m6} we have
E
[
L
i
(p′i,σ
m
−i)
∣∣∣Li(p′i,σm−i)≥ viα(p′i,σm−i)]<E[Li(p̂mi ,σm−i)∣∣∣Li(p̂mi ,σm−i)≥ viα(p̂mi ,σm−i)]− . (45)
Equation (45) contradicts the fact that p̂mi ∈ supp(CB(σm−i)), which completes the proof that
CB(σ) has a closed graph.
As listed above, the CVaRα best response function CB(σ) satisfies the four conditions of Kaku-
tani’s Fixed Point Theorem. As a direct result, for any finite n-player stochastic congestion game,
there exists σ∗ ∈ Σ such that σ∗ ∈ CB(σ∗), which completes the existence proof of a CVaRα
equilibrium for such games. 
